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Abstract
This paper attempts to analyse the problem of how a government allocates resources to different social classes. We combine and
extend two existing lines of research in game theoretical studies of political economy, building on Buenrostro et al. [3] who analysed
how protests affect governments’ decisions, but not including class conﬂict, and Acemouglu [1] who does include class conﬂict
but does not take into account protests. We develop a continuous time framework and obtain a stochastic differential game, where
the government as well as the upper and lower social classes represent the players involved in the game. The stationary feedback
Nash-equilibrium strategies are derived. Furthermore, we compare the results with another two cases where the government and
the upper social class maximize their joint utility and the government transfers some resources to the lower social class. We ﬁnd
that under some speciﬁc conditions, the government which transfers some resources to the lower social class is more successful in
creating a more harmonious society.
c© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Organising Committee
of ICOAE 2013
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1. Introduction
How government fairly allocates resources to different social classes is a core issue in political economy, as it
affects the livelihood of each social class. It is always hard to distribute resources to satisfy all social classes, since
each social class has its favourable policies and some of the policies required by one social class may conﬂict with
the beneﬁt of another social class. For instance, labour can proﬁt from a policy of raising minimum wage, while the
beneﬁts of corporations are reduced due to an increase in human costs.
Different social classes can adopt different methods of inducing the government to carry out policies from which
they proﬁt. An economically strong but politically weak social class can convince the government to implement
policies favourable to it by means of a direct transfer of resources. An economically and politically weak social class,
on the other hand, uses protest as a channel to express its dissatisﬁcation with a policy or policies carried out by the
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government. Protest movements may be followed by social problems of security, and could be quite harmful to the
government’s reputation. Therefore, to analyse the issue of how governments allocate resources, it is important to
take into account not only the class conﬂict but also the effect of protest.
Protest has been studied in a variety of strands of the literature for decades. Protest has been deﬁned in Lipsky
[9] as ”a mode of political action oriented toward objection to one or more policies or conditions, characterises
by showmanship or display of unconventional nature, and undertake to obtain rewards from political or economic
systems.” Buenrostro et al. [3] indicate in their paper that one of the purposes of protest is to deliver a message to the
government and this is the type of protest movement we consider in our paper. The literature related to protest can be
classiﬁed into two types, i.e., individual participant and collective action. The former and the latter type discuss the
issue of why an individual and a group decide to participate in a protest movement, respectively. Literature related to
the former type includes Olson [11], Finkel et al. [6] and Lohmann [10].
Unlike the literature related to the former type, Buenrostro et al. [3] study when a group will join in a protest
movement and how a government will respond to the protest movement. They established a game-theoretical model
based on the one used by Kreps and Wilson [7] to explain different governments’ responses to protest, where each
government’s reputation is either weak or tough. From our perspective, however, it is not sensible that all protest
groups and governments have to take action in sequence, instead of simultaneously. Furthermore, the model focuses
on whether a protest movement is successful or not rather than on the dynamic interaction between a government and
a protest group. The authors are also successful in providing empirical evidence to support their insights. It may not
be so obvious whether a protest movement is successful or not. A government may make a compromise with a protest
group instead of giving in to the group.
Thus far, we have discussed the literature related to protest. We now move on to the literature related to class
conﬂict. Acemoglu [1] set up a difference game to study the problem,in which the elite who are politically strong,
and the various non-elite, who are politically weak, compete for the same resource, i.e., labour. The author shows that
the Nash-equilibrium is generally inefﬁcient for three possible reasons: revenue extraction, factor price manipulation,
and political consolidation. The elite may also try to impoverish the other groups who compete for political power.
Dynamic games have been applied in political economy for decades. Apart from Buenrostro et al. [3] and Ace-
moglu [1], more recent examples include Baron et al. [2] and Diermeier and Fong [4]. Nevertheless, these authors
developed discrete time frameworks, which resulted in either difference games or sequential games. To our knowl-
edge, differential game theory has not been widely applied in political economy and it is worth developing differential
games to investigate problems in this ﬁeld. Differential game models allow players to determine strategies continu-
ously over time and to change strategies according to the current time or states at any time. Wang and Thampanishvong
[14] established a differential game model to analyse a problem where the government chooses the investment in the
public good required by the citizens who express dissatisﬁcation by protesting. Therefore, the government’s raising
its investment in the public good is under the threat of protest. The authors show that protesting longer is not sufﬁcient
for inducing the government to raise the investment in the public good. Nonetheless, the authors fail in capturing the
class conﬂict in the model, which motivates us to extend the model.
In this paper, we develop a continuous time framework to establish a differential gamemodel involves three players:
the government, the upper class, and the lower class. This assumption allows us to take into account heterogeneity
across different social classes. The government invests in both a public and a private good, which are both affected
by a random event, and the lower social class contributes to its production. The upper social class, on the other hand,
offers a direct transfer of resources to induce the government to invest more in the private good consumed by it. Both
classes are able to determine the amounts of time they spend working. A longer time spent working implies a shorter
time spent protesting. Therefore, how the government distributes resources is still under the threat of protest. We
show that protesting longer may be sufﬁcient for inducing the government to invest more in the public good, under
some speciﬁc conditions. We also compare three types of governments and analyse which one is able to create a more
harmonious society.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model environment, in which the government
is assumed to be neutral. Section 3 is devoted to a sensitivity analysis, which studies how the parameters affect the
optimal strategies of the players. In Section 4, we consider another two types of government. One cooperates with
the upper social class while the other is leftwing. We then compare these three situations and determine which one
dominates, in some sense, the others. Some conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
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2. The Model
In this section, we present the game-theoretical model for analysing the class conﬂict problem. We consider three
groups: the government, the upper social class (large corporations), and the lower social class (labour). Each class
can determine the amount of time it spends working. A small amount of time a given class spends working implies
that that class is more likely to spend longer protesting. On the other hand, the government can determine the resource
allocation, investing in different policies or goods. There are two states imposed in the model, i.e.,
dx(t) = (ul(t)− δx(t))dt−σx(t)dJ(t), x(0) = x0 > 0, (1)
dy(t) = (uc(t)−ηy(t))dt−βy(t)dJ(t), y(0) = y0 > 0, (2)
where x and y are the public and private goods consumed by the lower social class and the upper social class, respec-
tively. We assume that the consumption by the upper social class of the public good is negligible. ul and uc are the
investments of the government in x and y, respectively. δ > 0 and η > 0 are the depreciation rates in x and y. J(t) is a
jump process such that dJ(t) = 1 with probability λdt and dJ(t) = 0 with probability 1−λdt, where λ > 0 denotes
the mean arrival rate of a random event, during a time interval of inﬁnitesimal length dt. σ and β are positive, to
capture the effect of the event on each good.
Let r > 0 denote the discount rate. The objective functional of the lower social class is
Vl(x,y) =max
vl≥0
E
{∫
∞
t
e−r(s−t) (1−α)
(
wlx(s)vl(s)−Lv2l (s)
)
ds |(x(t),y(t)) = (x,y)
}
. (3)
The interpretation of (3) follows. 1−α , where α ∈ (0, 12), is the group size of the lower social class. vl is the amount
of time that the group spends working. We impose the assumption that the larger is the amount of time the group
spends working, the smaller is the amount of time it spends protesting. wl > 0 and wlx represents the wage paid to
the group if it spends one unit of time working. The wage rate depends on the value of the public good, x. L > 0
represents the stress index if one spends a unit amount of time working. One examples of the stress index are the price
index of some speciﬁc goods and services such as foods and utilities for a person’s sustainable livelihood. A larger
price index or a higher tax leads to a higher stress index and this can be offset by a higher wage. Stress increases
signiﬁcantly with the amount of time one spends working, i.e., Lv2l , and can be compensated for by raising the wage
rate.
We now move on to deﬁning the utility of the upper social class. The objective functional of the upper social class
is
Vc(x,y) =max
vc≥0
E
{∫
∞
t
e−r(s−t)
[
α
(
pwcy(s)vc(s)− v2c(s)
)
− p(1−α)wlx(s)vl(s)
]
ds |(x(t),y(t)) = (x,y)
}
, (4)
where vc is the amount of time the group spends working. α is the group size of the upper social class. wc is given
much greater than wl and wcy is the wage paid to the group. The interpretation is that the wage rate paid to the upper
social class is much higher than that paid to the lower social class. We suppose that the upper social class has to
pay the wage to the lower social class, i.e., (1−α)wlxvl . Therefore, the upper social class receives an amount of
capital, αwcyvc − (1−α)wlxwl . On the other hand, the upper social class offers a fund to the government, which
is proportional to the capital gain. The proportion of the capital given to the government is 1− p, where p ∈ (0,1).
The stress index for working one unit of time is normalised to 1. We then assume that L > 1 since the sustainable
livelihood of the lower social class is more sensitive to the prices of speciﬁc goods and services.
We now discuss the utility of the government. The government can invest in both goods and face the costs of
investing in x and y. We assume that the costs take the following functional forms: Cx(ul) = clu2l , andCy(uc) = ccu2c ,
where cl and cc are positive. The lower social class contributes to the production of these resources, which depends
on the value of the public good, x, and the amount of time the social class spends working, vl . We suppose that the
production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form, i.e., P(x,vl) = Axγ [(1−α)vl ]1−γ , where A > 0 and γ ∈
(
0, 12
)
. The
interpretation of γ < 12 is that the major contribution to the production is made by the lower social class instead of
by the government. Note that the production function is independent of the value of the private good. A real world
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example is the Obama-McConnell tax-cut deal in the United States, which was expected to be able to stimulate the
economy. However, as Krugman [8] explained, ”Tax cuts for the wealthy will barely be spent at all; even middle-class
tax cuts won’t add much to spending. And the business tax break will, I believe, do hardly anything to spur investment
given the excess capacity businesses already have. The actual stimulus in the plan comes from the other measures,
mainly unemployment beneﬁts and the payroll tax break.” This is evidence supporting the idea that production may
not be dependent on the private good that beneﬁts the upper social class. The fund offered by the upper social class is
F(x,y,vl ,vc) = (1− p)[αwcyvc− (1−α)wlxvl ]. Therefore, the objective functional of the government is
Vg(x,y) =max
ul ,uc
E
{∫
∞
t
e−r(s−t) (P(s)−Cx(s)−Cy(s)+F(s))ds |(x(t),y(t)) = (x,y)
}
. (5)
Hence, the differential game model is (3)-(5), with the two constraints (1)-(2).
We derive the stationary feedback Nash-equilibrium strategies for all players, i.e., a strategy depends only on states.
By applying the dynamic programming principle and the method in Ewald and Wang [5], we obtain the following
results:
v∗l (x,y) =
wl
2L
x,
v∗c(x,y) =
pwc
2
y,
u∗l (x,y) =
1
2cl
∂
∂xVg(x,y),
u∗c(x,y) =
1
2cc
∂
∂yVg(x,y),
Vl(x,y) = Blxxx2+Blxx+Bl0,
Vc(x,y) = Bcxxx2+Bcyyy2+Bcxx+Bc0,
Vg(x,y) = Bgxxx2+Bgyyy2+Bgxx+B
g
0,
where
Blxx =
1
φ1− 2cl B
g
xx
(1−α)w2l
4L
> 0,
Blx =
1
clφ3−Bgxx B
g
xB
l
xx > 0,
Bl0 =
1
2clr
BgxBlx > 0,
Bcxx = −
1
φ1− 2cl B
g
xx
(1−α) pw2l
2L
< 0,
Bcyy =
1
φ2− 2cc B
g
yy
α p2w2c
4
> 0,
Bcx =
1
clφ3−Bgxx B
g
xBcxx < 0,
Bc0 =
1
2clr
BgxB
c
x < 0,
Bgxx =
clφ1− cl
√
φ21 + 2(1−α)(1−p)w
2
l
clL
2
< 0,
Bgyy =
ccφ2− cc
√
φ22 − 2α p(1−p)w
2
c
cc
2
> 0,
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Bgx =
A
φ3− 1cl B
g
xx
[
(1−α)wl
2L
]1−γ
> 0,
Bg0 =
1
4clr
(Bgx)
2
> 0,
as well as φ1 = r+2δ +λσ(2−σ), φ2 = r+2η+λβ (2−β ), and φ3 = r+ δ +λσ .
It can be seen in v∗i (x,y), where i= l,c, that each group’s concern is the wage rate. The stress index L, on the other
hand, reduces the amount of time the lower social class spends working. Each group’s decision is unaffected by the
government’s current investment in the goods. The interpretation is that each group cares about its livelihood instead
of the government’s response to any dissatisﬁcation. It also can be seen in u∗i (x,y), where i= l,c, that the government
has less incentives to invest in a good if the cost of investing in it is high. Substituting u∗l (x,y) into Equation (1), we
ﬁnd that the maximumvalue of the public good the government will arrange is
x∗ =
Bgx
2clδ −2Bgxx
.
3. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we study how the parameters affect x∗ and the Nash-equilibrium strategies. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that the initial value of the public good x0 is smaller than x∗. The parameters of primary interest
include L, σ , β , and λ .
3.1. The Case of L and λ
It is ambiguous whether x∗ is increasing in L. Nevertheless, given φ1 > (<)0, it can be shown that there exists an
¯L such that x∗ is decreasing (increasing) in L over ( ¯L,∞). Due to the deﬁnition of L, it is reasonable to assume that L
is large. The government may encounter four situations:
1. The current environment is not risky, i.e., σ is small, and the stress index L rises.
2. The current environment is not risky, i.e., σ is small, and the stress index L drops.
3. The current environment is very risky, i.e., σ is large, and the stress index L rises.
4. The current environment is very risky, i.e., σ is large, and the stress index L drops.
If the ﬁrst situation occurs, the government will reduce x∗. The interpretation is that the government does not take
into account the impact of the random event on the public good. Since the stress index is large, the lower social class
requires a higher wage to compensate for the stress of work. It becomes more costly to raise x∗ to a certain level and
the government then has less incentives to increase x∗. Even though the production reduces due to a lower x∗, the
direct transfer of the resources from the upper social class goes up, which may offset the loss from the production.
If the second situation occurs, the government still does not take into account the impact of the random event on the
public good. A smaller stress index leads the lower social class to spend a shorter time protesting, which leads to a
rise in the production easily. The government therefore has more incentives to invest in the public good to increase
x∗. The upper social class in this case has to pay a higher wage to the lower social class, which then reduces the direct
transfer of the resources to the government. However, the gain of the production may offset the loss of the direct
transfer of resources from the upper social class.
If the third or the last situation occurs, the government will take into account the impact of the random event on the
public good. Then we ﬁnd that the government will raise x∗ if a higher stress index is observed. The interpretation
is that the random event suddenly pulls down the value of the public good to a low level, and the lower social class
suddenly spend a longer time protesting. This reduces the production sharply. Therefore, to reduce the damage of the
random event to the public good, the government must raise x∗ to a higher level.
Note that both the random event and the protest by the lower social class affect the value of the public good.
However, their effects are different. The random event reduces the value of the public good suddenly while the protest
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of the lower social class reduces the value of the public good continuously. The production declines more signiﬁcantly
in the former case than in the latter case. Therefore, the government is threatened by the protest of the lower social
class only if the environment is too risky. Nevertheless, it must be highlighted that this does not imply that protesting
longer is sufﬁcient for inducing the government to invest more in the public good.
How the stress index L affects the Nash-equilibrium strategies is as follows. L does not concern the upper social
class, which results in that v∗c(x,y) is independent of L. Since the upper social class does not change their behaviour,
the government maintains its investment in the private good y. On the other hand, the lower social class spends more
time protesting if L is large since its requires a higher wage to compensate for the stress from working. If the public
good x is not risky, i.e., Situations 1. or 2., it can be shown that the government invests more in the public good in
Situation 2 than in Situation 1.. If the public good x is too risky, i.e., Situations 3. and 4., we ﬁnd that the government
raises x∗ to a higher value given a larger stress index. Nonetheless, the government must wait until the production
goes up to a certain level, which leads the government to have sufﬁcient resources to invest in the public good.
3.2. The Case of β
Recall that β models how the random event affects the value of the private good y. Since it is independent of the
public good x, the government does not change the optimal investment in the public good. Hence, β does not affect
x∗. On the other hand, neither the upper social class nor the lower social class is concerned about the random event.
This leads to v∗l (x) and v∗c(y) remaining the same. u∗l (x) is the optimal investment in the public good, which is not
affected by β and then remains the same.
u∗c(y) is the only Nash-equilibrium strategy inﬂuenced by β . Note that it becomes more costly to raise the value of
the private good to a certain level if β is larger. The government may have less incentives to invest in the private good.
If β is small, this raises the impact of the protest by the upper social class slightly. The transfer of resources from
the upper social class is then reduced only slightly and then the government does not take into account the impact.
Therefore, the government reduces investment in the private good. On the other hand, if β is big, the value of the
private good drops sharply, which also leads the upper social class to be very dissatisﬁed. The transfer of resources
from the upper social class therefore declines signiﬁcantly, and the government must invest more in the public good
to mitigate the damage of the random event to the private good.
3.3. The Case of λ
It can be shown that given σ ≥ 1, x∗ is decreasing in λ . The interpretation is that given a big impact of the random
event’s occurring, then if the random event occurs more frequently, the government has less incentives to raise the
maximum value of the public good. The government does not raise the maximum value of the public good to mitigate
the impact of the random event. If it was not true, the governmentwould have to keep the investment in the public good
at a higher level. This is too costly since the random event occurrs more frequently this then reduces the government’s
incentives to invest in the public good, and therefore x∗ declines.
We now study how λ affects the Nash-equilibrium strategies. It can be seen that u∗l (x) and u∗c(y) are independent
of λ . Since both the lower and upper social classes are concerned about only the values of the public and private good,
respectively, the frequency of the random event’s occurring does not affect the optimal amounts of time they spend
working. On the other hand, it can be shown that the government reduces the investments in the public and private
goods. The interpretation is that the government has less incentives to invest in them since the random event occurrs
more frequently.
To summarise the discussion, we have found that the government does not reduce the maximum value of the
public good only if the impact of the random event on the public good is sufﬁciently big and the stress index soars.
Even though protesting longer by the lower social class is caused by a lower maximum value of the public good, the
government is not concerned about it. Note that it is hard to conclude that given a big impact of the random event on
the public good, a higher stress index implies that the government is concerned about the protest by the lower social
class. The government may be concerned about a very low value of the public good, rather than protesting longer by
the lower social class. On the other hand, the government does not raise the investment in the private good unless the
impact of the random event on the private good is big. Therefore, we conclude that protesting longer is not sufﬁcient
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to induce the government to pay more attention to people’s livelihood, which agrees with the result of Wang and
Thampanishvong [14].
4. Two Types of Governments
In this section, we analyse two cases, i.e., the government either stands on the side of the upper social class or
behaves as a leftwing government. This enables us to compare the two cases with the previous case and to determine
which case leads to better economy and reduces the impact of protests by both classes.
4.1. A Government Cooperating with the Upper Social Class
We ﬁrst consider the case where the government stands on the side of the upper social class. One real world example
of such a case is as follows. The current Taiwanese government, the Ma Ying-jeou government, has announced that
the minimum monthly wage will be raised conditionally, see Taipei Times [12] [13]. Let ul , uc, vl , and vc be replaced
by ul,gc, uc,gc, vl,gc, and vc,gc, respectively, but the interpretations remain the same. To capture the situation in our
model, we consider the joint value function:
Vgc(x,y) = max
ul,gc,uc,gc,vc,gc
E
{∫
∞
t
e−r(s−t)
(
P(x(s),vl,gc(s))−Cx(s)−Cy(s)+Fgc(s)
)
ds |(x(t),y(t)) = (x,y)
}
, (6)
where Fgc(s) = α
(
wcy(s)vc,gc(s)− v2c,gc(s)
)
− (1−α)wlx(s)vl,gc(s). The value function for the lower social class
is denoted by Vl,gc(x,y), which is deﬁned as the RHS of (3) but with vl replaced by vl,gc. Applying the dynamic
programming and Ewld and Wang [5] again, we obtain
v∗l,gc(x) =
wl
2L
x,
u∗l,gc(x) =
1
2cl
∂
∂xVgc(x,y),
u∗c,gc(x) =
1
2cc
∂
∂yVgc(x,y),
v∗c,gc(x) =
wc
2
y,
Vl,gc(x,y) = Bl,gcxx x2+Bl,gcx x+B
l,gc
0 ,
Vgc(x,y) = Bgcxxx2+Bgcyyy2+Bgcx x+B
gc
0 ,
where
Bl,gcxx =
1
φ1− 2cl B
gc
xx
(1−α)w2l
4L
> 0,
Bl,gcx =
1
clφ3−Bgcxx B
gc
x B
l,gc
xx > 0,
Bl,gc0 =
1
2clr
Bgcx B
l,gc
x > 0,
Bgcxx =
clφ1− cl
√
φ21 + 2(1−α)w
2
l
clL
2
< 0,
Bgcyy =
ccφ2− cc
√
φ22 − αw
2
c
cc
2
> 0,
Bgcx =
A
φ3− 1cl B
gc
xx
[
(1−α)wl
2L
]1−γ
> 0,
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Bgc0 =
1
4clr
(Bgcx )
2
> 0.
4.2. A Leftwing Government
The case analysed in Section 2 is to assume that the government is neutral, i.e., it stands on the side of neither
the upper nor the lower social class. On the other hand, the case considered in Section 4.1 is to suppose that the
government stands on the side of the upper social class, which implies that they tend to maximise the joint value
function. In this subsection, we study the case where the government is a leftwing government. One feature of such
a government is that it is usually concerned about relatively disadvantaged social classes. Therefore, to capture this
phenomenon, we assume that the government transfers some resources to the lower social class to reduce the stress
index.
Let ul , uc, vl and vc be replaced by u˜l , u˜c, v˜l and v˜c, respectively. We furthermore assume that the value functions
for the government, the upper social class, and the lower social class, are denoted by ˜Vg(x,y), ˜Vc(x,y) and ˜Vl(x,y).
The value function ˜Vc(x,y) is deﬁned as in (4) but the corresponding parameters are replaced. On the other hand, the
value functions, ˜Vg(x,y) and ˜Vl(x,y), are deﬁned as
˜Vg(x,y) =max
u˜l ,u˜c
E
{∫
∞
t
e−r(s−t)
(
P(s)−Cx(s)−Cy(s)+F(s)− kv˜2l (s)
)
ds |(x(t),y(t)) = (x,y)
}
, (7)
and
˜Vl(x,y) =max
v˜l
E
{∫
∞
0
e−r(s−t)(1−α)
[
wlx(s)v˜l(s)−
(
L−
k
1−α
)
v˜2l (s)
]
ds |(x(t),y(t)) = (x,y)
}
, (8)
where P(s), Cx(s), Cy(s) and F(s) are as deﬁned in Section 2 but with ul , uc, vl , and vc replaced by u˜l , u˜c, v˜l , and v˜c,
respectively. k is given such that 0< k < (1−α)L. Let ˜L = L− k1−α . The Nash-equilibrium strategies are
v˜∗l (x,y) =
wl
2˜L
x,
v˜∗c(x,y) =
pwc
2
y,
u˜∗l (x,y) =
1
2cl
∂
∂x
˜Vg(x,y),
u˜∗c(x,y) =
1
2cc
∂
∂y
˜Vg(x,y).
On the other hand, the value functions, ˜Vl(x,y), ˜Vc(x,y) and ˜Vg(x,y) are deﬁned in the same was the corresponding
ones in Section 2 but
˜Bgxx =
clφ1− cl
√
φ21 +
2[(1−α)(1−p)+ k2˜L ]w
2
l
cl ˜L
2
and other parameters are replaced by the ones deﬁned in this subsection.
4.3. Comparison
In this subsection, we compare the three cases, i.e., the cases analysed in Sections 2, 4.1, and 4.2. We compute
the maximum amount of time the lower social class spends working given each type of government. We are not
concerned about the amount of time the upper social class spends working. Whatever government type we consider, it
keeps raising the investment in the private good over the value of the private good. This will eventually lead the upper
social class to spend much less time protesting. Therefore, to determine whether a society is harmonious, it is much
more reasonable to take into account only the maximum amount of time the lower social class spends working.
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We deﬁne the three maximum values of the public good in Sections 2, 4.1, and 4.2, respectively, i.e.,
x∗ =
Bgx
2clδ −2Bgxx
,
x∗gc =
Bgcx
2clδ −2Bgcxx
,
x˜∗ =
˜Bgx
2clδ −2 ˜Bgxx
.
Then the maximum amounts of time the lower social class spends working are v∗l (x∗) =
wl
2Lx
∗
, v∗l,gc(x
∗
gc) =
wl
2Lx
∗
gc, and
v˜∗l (x˜
∗) = wl2˜L x˜
∗
. It can be shown that x∗gc < x∗ and v∗l,gc(x∗gc)< v∗l (x∗). On the other hand, whether x∗ is smaller than x˜∗
is ambiguous. See Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. x∗, x∗gc and x˜∗ given r = 4%, δ = 10%, λ = 1, σ = 1.5, γ = 20%, cl = 20%, wl = 10%(up) and 60%(down),
α = 5%, p= 90%, A= 5 and L= 5.
Given a sufﬁciently small w
2
l
L , it can be shown that there exists a small ˜k> 0 such that v˜(x˜
∗,y) is increasing in
[
0, ˜k
]
.
The implication is that the lower social class spends less time protesting if the government transfers some resources
to it to reduce the stress index. Note that there is a condition imposed on the proposition. Nonetheless, the condition
is realistic. If a higher unit of wage or a lower stress index is given, the lower social class will not be likely to spend
a longer time protesting. Hence, the government does not need to reduce the stress index for the class. On the other
hand, it may not be sensible that the government reduces the stress index too signiﬁcantly. If the government had
decided to reduce the stress index sharply, it would need to transfer much more resources to the lower social class,
which reduces the government’s utility more signiﬁcantly. Therefore, the government should offer resources to reduce
the stress index slightly. To summarise, our analysis results in
v∗l,gc
(
x∗gc
)
< v∗l (x
∗)< v˜∗l (x˜
∗) , (9)
given a sufﬁciently small w
2
l
L , i.e., a sufﬁciently small unit of wage or a sufﬁciently large stress index, and a sufﬁciently
small k. Inequality (9) also indicates that the leftwing government performs better than the other two types since it
leads to a more harmonious society.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed how a government allocates resources to the public good mainly consumed by the
lower social class and to the private good only consumed by the upper social class. The value of each good drops if a
random event happens. We suppose that a class spending more time working leads it to spending less time protesting.
We ﬁrst considered the case where the government is neutral, and derived the Nash-equilibrium strategies for the
three players, the government as well as the upper and lower social classes. We found that the government reduces
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investment in the public good and raises the investment in the private good. Our sensitivity analysis showed that the
government raises investment in the private good if the impact of the random event on the private good is sufﬁciently
big. A analogous result is observed if both the impact of the random event on the public good and the stress index are
sufﬁciently big. Otherwise, the government reduces investment in the public good, which is a discouraging result.
We also studied the cases where the government and the upper social class try to maximize their joint utility, and
the case where the government transfers some resources to the lower social class to reduce the stress index. We found
that both types of governments still increase investment in the private good and reduces investment in the public good.
Nevertheless, given a sufﬁciently low unit of wage or a sufﬁciently large stress index, the lower social class is willing
to spend a comparatively long time working if the government transfers resources to it. This result suggests that to
reach a more harmonious society, the government should be more concerned about the lower social class. Note that
transferring a huge amount of resources to the lower social class may not lead to a better result since the government
may reduce investment in the public good, which therefore causes a smaller maximum amount for the time the lower
social class spends working.
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